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NOTES
THE DATION EN PAIEMENT: PROBLEMS WITH THE ELUSIVE
CONCEPT OF PREJUDICE WHEN BRINGING THE REVOCATORY ACTION
An unsecured creditor brought an action to revoke a dation en
paiement made by a debtor to a secured creditor, alleging that the
debtor was insolvent and that the dation gave an unfair preference
to the secured creditor to the prejudice of the plaintiff. The supreme
court affirmed the finding of insolvency by the first circuit and held
the plaintiff was not prejudiced when preferred claims amounted to
more than the value of the property given, thereby leaving nothing
that could be applied to the unsecured debt owed to the plaintiff.
Martin LeBreton Insurance Agency v. Phillips, 364 So. 2d 1032 (La.
1978).
The dation en paiement, or giving in payment, is an act by
which a debtor gives a thing to his creditor in payment for the debt
owed;1 it generally has the effect of transferring title just as an or-
dinary contract of sale.! However, the ordinary sale is perfect by
mere consent of the parties, while the dation en paiement requires
actual delivery.'
According to article 3183 of the Civil Code, the property of a
debtor is the common pledge of his creditors "unless there exist
among the creditors some lawful causes of preference."' However,
the debtor, although insolvent, may "lawfully sell for the price
which is paid to him; but the law forbids to give in payment to one
creditor, to the prejudice of others, any other thing than the sum of
money due.' '
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2655.
2. Quality Finance Co. of Donaldsonville, Inc. v. Bourque, 315 So. 2d 656 (La.
1975).
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2656.
4. See, e.g., Feist v. Wilier & Gamm, 16 La. App. 618, 133 So. 797 (2d Cir. 1931).
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2658 (emphasis added). See generally Lowenberg, Marks &
Co. v. H. & C. Newman, Ltd., 142 La. 959, 77 So. 891 (1918). Lowenberg, interpreting
article 1978, held that an insolvent debtor's transfer of property will not be set aside
unless there is injury to the complaining creditor.
6. In fact, there are three basic actions available to creditors to protect their
rights: the revocatory action, the oblique action, and the action in declaration of
simulation.
The revocatory action gives to creditors an action to annul any contract made in
fraud of their rights, provided they are able to show that their rights were prejudiced
by the action of the debtor. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1969-94; Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank
v. Shipp, 232 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970). The oblique action allows a creditor to
exercise all rights existing in favor of the debtor, but which the debtor has failed or
neglected to exercise, for recovering possession of property to which the debtor is en-
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In the event that a debtor transfers property out of his
patrimony to one of his creditors, the revocatory action is available
to protect the rights of the remaining creditors! The revocatory ac-
tion has its foundation in article 3183, which provides that the pro-
perty of the debtor is the common pledge of his creditors, and fur-
ther makes that property available to creditors who are prejudiced
at the time a fraudulent transfer is made by their debtor.' If the
revocatory action is successful, the transfer is set aside, but only for
the benefit of the creditors who timely attack the transfer The pro-
perty is not returned to the estate of the debtor. Rather, the
transferred property is made available to satisfy the claims of
creditors who sue timely; the original transferee is entitled to retain
any excess over the claims of the complaining creditors
The revocatory action is not limited to the contract of sale. Arti-
cle 1969 provides that "every act done by a debtor with the intent
of depriving his creditor of the eventual right he has upon the pro-
perty of such debtor, is illegal, and ought, as respects such creditor,
to be avoided." It is well-settled that the revocatory action can be
used to set aside a dation en paiement made by an insolvent
creditor under article 2658."° An analysis of the Civil Code11 and of
the jurisprudence12 reveals that in order for a complaining creditor
to prevail in the revocation of a dation en paiement, he must prove
the following four substantive elements:1
(1) The plaintiff was a creditor of the transferor on the date of
dation."
titled. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1990. The action in declaration of simulation is available
whenever the effects of an apparent transfer are suppressed by another contract
which remains secret, called a counterletter. An action for nullity of the transfer will
lie in favor of complaining creditors. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2239. See generally Willis v.
Scott, 33 La. Ann. 1026 (1881). This note concerns only the revocatory action, or actio
Pauliana (Paulian action) as it was originally called.
7. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1978 & 2658.
8. Tate, The Revocatory Action in Louisiana Law, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW
OF OBLIGATIONS 134 (J. Dainow ed. 1969). The action must be brought within one year.
LA. CIV. CODE 1987 & 1994.
9. Tate, supra note 8, at 134.
10. See, e.g., Harman v. Defatta, 182 La. 463, 162 So. 44 (1935); Lovell v. Payne,
30 La. Ann. 511 (1878); Taylor v. Knox, 2 La. 16 (1830).
11. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1968-84 & 2655-59.
12. See, e.g., Harman v. Defatta, 182 La. 463, 162 So. 44 (1935); Lowenberg, Marks
& Co. v. H. & C. Newman, Ltd., 142 La. 959, 77 So. 891 (1918); Perigoni v. McNiece,
307 So. 2d 407 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
13. These four elements are not specifically listed in any article or case, but can
be gleaned from an analysis of the relevant Civil Code articles and the jurisprudence
interpreting them.
14. See Perigoni v. McNiece, 307 So. 2d at 410; Lowenberg, Marks & Co. v. H. &
C. Newman, Ltd., 142 La. at 967, 77 So. at 893; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1993. See also LA.
CIv. CODE arts. 1972 & 1975.
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(2) On the date of the transfer, the transferor was insolvent.'5
(3) The transfer was in fraud of the rights of creditors.'"
(4) The complaining creditor was prejudiced by the transfer."
The first element indicates that the revocatory action is
available only to a creditor that is prejudiced at the time the
transfer takes place. It cannot be exercised by a party that becomes
a creditor of the transferor after the transfer takes place. 8
In order to rescind the transfer made in fraud of his rights, the
creditor must file suit against the transferee. The general provision
in the Civil Code dealing with the revocatory action is article 1970,
which gives every creditor the right to annul any contract made in
fraud of his rights.' However, article 1972 modifies this right so as
to allow only judgment creditors to annul fraudulent transfers."0 A
complaining creditor must either reduce his claim to judgment
against the original debtor prior to instituting the revocatory action,
or he must elect at the time he brings the revocatory action against
the transferee to join also an action against the debtor, seeking to
reduce his claim to judgment." The rationale for securing judgment
against the original debtor was set forth in Williams & Miller v.
Jones.' The first circuit explained that in the absence of a valid
15. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1984-85. See Perigoni v. McNiece, 307 So. 2d at 410;
Lowenberg, Marks & Co. v. H. & C. Newman, Inc., 142 La. at 967, 77 So. at 893.
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1978. See Perigoni v. McNiece, 307 So. 2d at 410; Harman v.
Defatta, 182 La. at 468, 162 So. at 46; Lowenberg, Marks & Co. v. H. & C. Newman,
Inc., 142 La. at 967-68, 77 So. at 893-94.
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2658. See, e.g., Harman v. Defatta, 182 La. 463, 162 So. 44
(1935); Jackson v. Miller, 32 La. Ann. 432 (1880); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Shipp, 232
So. 2d 810 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
18. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1993 provides: "No creditor can, by the action given by this
section, sue individually to annul any contract made before the time his debt accrued."
See, e.g., Lowenberg, Marks & Co. v. H. & C. Newman, Ltd., 142 La. at 967, 77 So. at
893; Pilsbery v. Fricke, 139 La. 153, 71 So. 349 (1916) (creditor has no standing to com-
plain of the transfer of property by his debtor until the debt has been created).
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1970 provides:
The law gives to every creditor, when there is no cession of goods, as well as to
the representatives of all the creditors where there is any such cession, or other
proceedings by which they are collectively represented, an action to annul any
contract made in fraud of their rights.
(Emphasis added.)
20. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1972 states: "It can not be exercised by individual creditors,
until their debts are liquidated by a judgment, unless the defendant in such action be
made a party to the suit for liquidating the debt brought against the original debtor in
the manner hereinafter directed."
21. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1972 & 1975.
22. 180 So. 140 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938). The revocation of a transfer of immovable
property was set aside because the complaining creditor failed to reduce his claim to a
judgment. Id. at 142.
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judgment, there might otherwise be situations where courts would
set aside transfers made by debtors when the creditor would not
legally be entitled to judgment against the debtor."
The second prerequisite for a successful revocatory action is
that the transferor must have been insolvent on the date of the
transfer. Civil Code article 1985 provides that a party is considered
insolvent when the whole of his assets is exceeded by his liabilities.2
The complaining creditor bears the burden of proof of establishing
the existence of the debtor's liabilities. However, once this is ac-
complished, the burden of proving that assets are greater than
liabilities is shifted to the transferee against whom the revocatory
action is brought."
A third requirement is that the transfer must be fraudulent as
to the complaining creditor. Article 1984 provides the formula for
determining fraud, stating that fraud will be found when the
transferee had knowledge of the insolvency of the transferor and
the contract gives the transferee an advantage over other creditors.
This has been jurisprudentially extended to include instances where
the transferee should have had knowledge." The Louisana Supreme
Court addressed the requirement of fraud in Harman v. Defatta"7
when the plaintiff, pursuant to Civil Code article 2658, attacked a
dation en paiement made by the defendant to his son, alleging that
the law forbids the giving in payment to one creditor a thing other
than money, where such a transfer works prejudice upon other
creditors. The defendant countered with a claim that the dation was
not fraudulent, and hence could not be revoked since article 1978
protects good faith transfers.28 The supreme court rejected the
defendant's argument, holding that a transfer made by an insolvent
debtor to one of his creditors in payment of a delinquent debt is
presumed to be made in fraud of the rights of other creditors. This
presumption may be overcome by testimony to the contrary.2 In
23. Id. at 142. Absent a requirement that the claim be reduced to judgment, the
courts arguably would be establishing a presumption that the transferor is legally in-
debted to the plaintiff. In actuality, the Code views the property of the debtor as the
common pledge of his creditors. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3183. To assure that a plaintiff is
entitled to a share in the property of a debtor, he must first prove that he is the legal
creditor of the debtor.
24. Solvency is defined in the Civil Code as "the ability to pay one's debts. He
who cannot pay all that he owes is not solvent." LA. CIv. CODE art. 3556(26).
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1985.
26. Acknowledging the need to further protect the rights of creditors, the
Louisiana Supreme Court extended the knowledge requirement in Swift & Co. v. Bon-
villian, 139 La. 558, 71 So. 849 (1916).
27. 182 La. 463, 162 So. 44 (1935).
28. Article 1978 provides that a transfer made in good faith cannot be annulled
even though it is injurious to creditors.
29. 182 La. at 469, 162 So. at 46.
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short, Harman provides that when a dation en paiement is made and
a complaining creditor is able to establish his pre-existing debtor
status and the insolvency of the transferor, the first two elements of
the revocatory action, a rebuttable presumption arises as to the ex-
istence of the third element of fraudulent intent.
The fourth and final element of the revocatory action is that the
transfer must have prejudiced the rights of the complaining
creditor. A complaining creditor is required to show that he was
prejudiced by the transfer in order to have standing to bring the
revocatory action, regardless of whether any other creditors were
similarly prejudiced." The determination of prejudice is a factual
question for which the courts have developed a straightforward test
based on the relationship between the value of the property given in
payment and the ranking of the indebtedness recorded against the
property. As the test is applied, if the value of all recorded
judgments, mortgages, and privileges which outrank the claim of the
complaining creditor exceeds the value of the property given in
payment, then the creditor has not been prejudiced." Under these
circumstances, if the property were to be sold for its fair market
value, all proceeds would be applied to the superior claims, leaving
nothing to satisfy the claim of the complaining creditor. On the
other hand, prejudice would result if the value of the preferred
claims does not exceed the value of the property. Should the proper-
ty be sold and the preferred claims satisfied, part of the proceeds
would still remain for application to the claim of the complaining
creditor. By denying him this remainder of the proceeds for the
satisfaction of his claim, the creditor would be prejudiced.
The Louisiana Supreme Court first addressed the issue of pre-
judice caused by a dation en paiement in Jackson v. Miller.8" In
Jackson, a debtor made a dation of property worth only one-third of
the amount of the debt for which the property was given. The court
held that there was no prejudice to the complaining creditor because
a forced sale in foreclosure of the mortgage would have consumed a
large part of the proceeds, leaving a large part of the debt un-
satisfied.8 The issue of prejudice arose again in Deposit Guaranty
National Bank v. Shipp,4 in which the second circuit found no pre-
judice to the complaining creditor in a dation of immovable property
to a creditor in satisfaction of a preferred debt of equal value to the
30. See note 17, supra. See also note 48, infra.
31. See generally Jackson v. Miller, 32 La. Ann. at 435; Succession of Cottingham,
29 La. Ann. 667, 670-71 (1877); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Shipp, 232 So. 2d at 814.
32. 32 La. Ann. 432 (1880).
33. I& at 435.
34. 232 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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property transferred. Judge (now Justice) Dixon, writing for the
court, held that inferior creditors were not prejudiced since the net
patrimony of the debtor had not been adversely affected. Further, if
the conveyance were set aside, the mortgage reinstated, and a
sheriff's sale provoked, it was apparent that the complaining
creditor could recognize nothing from the proceeds unless the pro-
perty were sold for a price which exceeded its value. 5 It is clear
that a prerequisite to a court's determination of the issue of pre-
judice should be an affirmative showing that the value of the pro-
perty exceeds all recorded claims ranking above that of the com-
plaining creditor.
The instant case presented a much more complicated factual
situation to which the test for determining prejudice could not be so
easily applied. In 1972, the Lamastuses borrowed $150,000, secured
by a collateral mortgage on a marina in favor of the defendant, First
Metropolitan Bank. Sometime in 1974, these debtors became delin-
quent in their payments to the bank; suit was filed and a judgment
in the sum of $200,000, including interests, costs, and attorney's
fees, was rendered in favor of the bank. 6 This judgment was subse-
quently recorded. Various judgments of other creditors were later
recorded; however, no attempt at collection was made until one of
the inferior creditors had the property seized in an unsuccessful ef-
fort to have it sold in August of 1976."7
In October of 1976, the bank began negotiating with the
Lamastuses in order to liquidate the outstanding indebtedness.
Ultimately, the parties agreed that the bank would accept a dation
of the property in payment of the debt. 8 Before this dation was ex-
ecuted, the Lamastuses executed a promissory note for $30,000 in
favor of the plaintiff in this action, Martin LeBreton Insurance
Agency; the note was secured by a collateral mortgage on the same
marina. Prior to recordation of the mortgage by Martin LeBreton,
the bank secured partial releases from other secured judgment
creditors89 having claims totaling $56,207.47, and accepted the dation
35. Id. at 814.
36. Transcript of Proceedings Before Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Brief
for Defendant-Appellee at 1, Martin LeBreton Ins. Agency v. Phillips, 364 So. 2d 1032
(La. 1978).
37. In actuality, there were two attempted sheriff's sales, the second taking place
in October of 1976. Id. at 6. Again, after the minimum bid had been announced three
times, no bids were made on the property.
38. Transcript of Proceedings Before Twenty-Second Judicial District Court,
Testimony at 39-45, Martin LeBreton Ins. Agency v. Phillips, 364 So. 2d 1032 (La.
1978).
39. These other mortgage creditors relinquished only their rights as to the
marina, reserving their personal rights as against the debtors. The judgments were
not cancelled in any way. Although there was testimony by Mr. Lamastus to the effect
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of the marina from the Lamastuses on February 24, 1977.40 The trial
court made a determination that at the time of the dations, the
Lamastuses were indebted to the bank for $257,442.52, and that the
value of the property given in payment was $303,500.00, exceeding
the amount of the debt by some $46,000. The insurance agency did
not record its mortgage until March 24, 1977, and thus was con-
sidered to be an unsecured creditor.4' Shortly thereafter, Martin
LeBreton filed a revocatory action' against the bank to rescind the
dation."8
The insurance agency claimed that it had been prejudiced by the
dation of its insolvent debtors and that the dation should be rescinded
because it was forbidden under article 2658 of the Civil Code. The
trial court found that the debtors were solvent" and that the in-
surance agency had the status of an unsecured creditor at the time
of the dation; therefore, it denied the relief sought since the secured
indebtedness exceeded the appraised value of the property. The
court of appeal reversed the trial court's determination of solvency
but nevertheless found that the dation did not prejudice the in-
that these inferior secured creditors were to receive $15,000 from the bank to be divided
among them in payment for the partial releases, the trial court did not indicate
whether it credited this testimony or not. Id. at 43 & 235.
40. 364 So. 2d at 1033. In fact, the mortgage by Martin LeBreton had been ex-
ecuted a month prior to the dation en paiement, but the mortgagee failed to record the
mortgage until after execution of the dation and therefore had the status of an
unsecured creditor.
41. I&
42. It is noteworthy that the complaining creditor may bring a petition for in-
voluntary bankruptcy against a debtor that has removed a part of his property with
the intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors or any of them. 11 U.S.C. § 21
(1952). However, under involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, the action for rescission
benefits all creditors of the debtor. It is likely that the complaining creditor opted for
the revocatory action, which benefits only the creditors that timely attack the
transfer, because the plaintiffs debt would possibly have been only partially discharged,
if at all, had a bankruptcy proceeding effected a distribution of assets. See text at
notes 9-10, supra.
43. 364 So. 2d at 1033-34. The record indicates that a separate suit was filed by
Mr. Lamastus against the bank to have the dation declared null by reason of fraud.
Mr. Lamastus claimed that in exchange for the dation, the bank had promised him the
option of repurchasing the marina prior to its sale to any third party. Mr. Lamastus'
suit was consolidated with the suit in the instant case for purposes of trial. The trial
court determined that there was no fraud, finding the dation to be valid. Mr. Lamastus
did not appeal.
44. Civil Code article 1985 provides that a party is considered insolvent when the
whole of his assets is exceeded by his liabilities. See note 25, supra, and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, although the liabilities of the Lamastuses exceeded their assets by
$13,000, the trial judge felt this was "not an appreciable amount" and found the debtor
solvent. Transcript of Proceedings Before Twenty-Second Judicial District Court,
Reasons for Decision at 4 Martin LeBreton Ins. Agency v. Phillips, 364 So. 2d 1032 (La.
1978) [hereinafter cited as Reasons for Decision).
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surance company. 5 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the First
Circuit Court of Appeal, holding that no prejudice resulted when the
claims of the inferior secured creditors ($56,207.47) would exhaust
the excess of the value of the property given in payment over the
value of the debt extinguished ($46,000), thereby leaving nothing for
the insurance agency, an unsecured creditor."
The majority's opinion is arguably an insufficient response to
the complexities of this case.' 7 In the first place, although insolvency
of the debtor was established, the majority failed to address the re-
quirement of articles 1970 and 1978 that the transfer of property by
a debtor be in fraud of the rights of creditors.'8 However, as the dis-
sent points out, the existence of fraud 9 can be found through the
concept of constructive fraud. Articles 1983 and 1984 provide that
constructive fraud occurs when a creditor, knowing his debtor to be
in insolvent circumstances, obtains an advantage over the other
creditors of the debtor. It is submitted, however, that it was not
necessary to use articles 1983 and 1984, which require a showing of
45. 357 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
46. 364 So. 2d at 1034-35.
47. Though the Civil Code requires that a debt be reduced to judgment prior to
instituting the revocatory action, or, in the alternative, that the creditor join the suit
against the debtor with the revocatory action filed against the transferee, see notes
21-23, supra, and accompanying text, no attempt had been made by Martin LeBreton
to secure a judgment against the debtors. Nevertheless, the court did not dismiss the
revocatory action, choosing, instead, to note the deficiency in a footnote and base its
decision on other grounds.
As a practical matter, the supreme court made the proper determination on this
issue. Had the court rejected the claim for rescission for failure to seek judgment
against the Lamastuses, the plaintiff would have simply had to amend its petition to
include a plea for judgment. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1972 & 1975. See Block v. Marks, 47
La. Ann. 107, 16 So. 649 (1895). In Block the complaining creditor's revocatory action
was rejected when the creditor failed to make the debtor a defendant and plead for
judgment. The creditor was allowed to amend his petition to include a plea for judg-
ment against the debtor. After a ruling on the plea for judgment by the trial court, the
supreme court would likely be confronted with the issue of prejudice again.
48. Since fraud is not mentioned in the majority opinion, it is impossible to deter-
mine whether the court overlooked this requirement of the revocatory action or
whether fraud was presumed under the circumstances. The court may have been con-
fused by the distinction between the required showing of fraud under articles 1970 and
1978 and of prejudice under article 2658, since the terms appear somewhat related.
However, they are separate and distinct prerequisites for bringing a revocatory action.
In order for a transfer to be rescinded, it must have been made in fraud of the rights
of creditors. The concept of fraud concerns the giving to one creditor an unfair
preference over the other creditors. On the other hand, the issue of prejudice goes to
the question of standing, for not every creditor has standing to bring the revocatory
action. Rather, only those creditors who have been prejudiced by the fraudulent
transfer may bring it.
49. 364 So. 2d at 1035 (Tate, J., dissenting). See note 57, infra.
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knowledge of insolvency by the transferee to establish fraud, since
Harman may be relied upon for a presumption of fraud when there
is a dation en paiement and the debtor is insolvent."
The court's treatment of the issue of prejudice to the complain-
ing creditor, the central issue presented in the case, is also un-
satisfactory. Recall that Civil Code article 2658 forbids the insolvent
debtor to give a thing other than money in payment to one creditor
to the prejudice of the others. Stating that "the test for determining
prejudice is a factual one, based on the value of the property and
the ranking of indebtedness,"5 the supreme court noted that, had
the property been sold for its fair market value at a judicial sale,
the complaining creditor would have received nothing since the
claims of the inferior secured creditors exceeded the excess value of
the property given in payment.2 The court's position appears
tenable only if the Lamastuses gave the property in payment to the
bank before the bank obtained the releases from the other secured
creditors. 3 Under these circumstances, at the time of the transfer, 54
there existed secured creditors with claims against the property
preferable to that of the complaining creditor. These preferred
claims totalled more than the excess of the value of the property
given over the value of the debt to the bank. Thus, there would
have been nothing left for the complaining creditor.
However, the court states that the dation was executed "after
securing releases from the other mortgage creditors."55 If indeed the
releases were obtained prior to the execution of the dation en paie-
ment, quite a different result should have been reached. Once the
releases were executed, the inferior secured creditors lost their
preferred status and became unsecured creditors like the plaintiff.
Under these conditions, at the time of the transfer, there were no
creditors whose preferred claims would have exhausted the excess
given in payment over the amount owed. Rather, all remaining
50. See text at notes 26-29, supra.
51. 364 So. 2d at 1034.
52. Id. at 1034-35. The court stated that preferred claims totalled $313,649.99,
while the value of the marina was only $303,500.00. Since the property was worth
some $10,000 less than the total outstanding secured indebtedness, the court said that
an unsecured creditor could not be prejudiced by the transfer. As a practical matter,
even if the property should appreciate slightly between the appraisal and the sale, the
expenses of a judicial sale are likely to consume the whole of the proceeds.
53. See notes 39-43, supra, and accompanying text. It is noteworthy that neither
the trial court nor the first circuit addressed the timing of the releases.
54. The first element of the revocatory action requires that a complaining creditor
be prejudiced at the time of the transfer. See text at notes 18-23, supra.
55. 364 So. 2d at 1033. Chief Justice Sanders, the organ of the court, writes:
"After securing releases from the other mortgage creditors, [the bank] and the
Lamastuses entered into a dation en paiement on February 24, 1977." Id
19791
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creditors had similar unsecured status and were equally prejudiced
under article 2658. Any and all unsecured creditors should have
been able to bring the revocatory action.
Justice Tate, in a dissenting opinion, argued that when the bank
obtained the property in the dation for less than its actual value, it
obtained an unfair preference. The result was a diminution of the
estate of the Lamastuses available for the payment of their remain-
ing unsecured creditors, in the amount of $46,000 which the bank
received in excess of the debt actually owed." By viewing the excess
given in payment as exhausting the remainder of the debtor's assets
which would otherwise have been available for the pro rata claims
of each of the unsecured creditors,57 the transfer prejudiced the
rights of all remaining unsecured creditors. This argument is ap-
parently based on a factual determination that the releases from the
other secured creditors were obtained before the dation. There can
be no finding of prejudice to the plaintiff if the releases came after
the dation. If that were the case, there would be preferred creditors
at the time of the dation, which would preclude a finding of pre-
judice."'
There are problems, however, with the implications of the dis-
sent. In the instant case, the property given in payment was worth
approximately $46,000 more than the $257,442.52 debt."0 The dissent
claims that the dation en paiement should have been set aside
because the remainder of the debtor's assets was diminished by this
$46,000, to the prejudice of the rest of the unsecured creditors. Are
all dations, however slight the excess, to be set aside upon a show-
ing of prejudice to the remaining unsecured creditors? This appears
to be the result which the logic of the dissent would demand. In
56. 364 So. 2d at 1036 (Tate, J., dissenting).
57. Justice Tate points out that the debtor, though insolvent, was not bankrupt.
Since the excess $46,000 was not used to reduce the claims of existing unsecured
creditors, there was in fact $46,000 less in the net patrimony of the debtor available
for the claims of the creditors. Id at 1035.
58. The dissent indicated that the conduct of the bank, in taking the property for
less than its fair market value, constituted constructive fraud against the rights of the
remaining creditors under article 1984. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1984 provides: "Every con-
tract shall be deemed to have been made in fraud of creditors, when the obligee knew
that the obligor was in insolvent circumstances, and when such contract gives to the
obligee, if he be a creditor, any advantage over other creditors of the obligor." Since
this constructive fraud resulted in the bank's receiving an unfair preference, the dis-
sent argues that the transfer should be set aside regardless of any good faith on the
part of the bank. 364 So. 2d at 1036 (Tate, J., dissenting).
59. See text at note 31, supra.
60. 364 So. 2d at 1035 (Tate, J., dissenting). The value of the property was
$303,500 and the debt owed to the bank by the Lamastuses was $257,442.52. Hence,
the excess given over the amount due was $46,057.48, or just under one-fifth. See note
62, infr.
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other words, under the dissent's rationale, had the value of the prop-
erty exceeded the amount of the debt by a single dollar instead of
$46,000, the transfer should nevertheless have been set aside.8 '
Although the Code gives some guidance as to when a transfer
should be set aside because of the existence of fraud,"2 it does not
aid in the determination of prejudice." A strict construction of the
dissent's view in conjunction with a finding of article 2658 prejudice
would indicate that even the slightest excess transferred over the
amount of the debt extinguished would necessitate rescission; this
slight excess would reduce the net patrimony of the debtor and
eventually prejudice all creditors down the line. Perhaps the court
was not willing to extend the revocatory action this far since it
believed that the excess transferred would merely go to satisfy the
claims of creditors superior to that of the plaintiff. Indeed, under
the reasoning of the court, had the transfer been rescinded and still
61. A realistic illustration of the problems that would arise under this theory is a
situation in which property worth several hundreds of thousands of dollars exceeds the
value of the debt by only a few thousand dollars or less. Among the practical problems
encountered would be an accurate determination of the value of the property given in
payment. For example, in the instant case, the trial judge listened to the testimony of
various witnesses before selecting the appraisal of one expert over that of others.
Reasons for Decision, supra note 44, at 2-3. When the actual amount of the valuation
will determine whether a transfer of this magnitude will be set aside, the parties will
place additional pressures on the trial court to make its determination with minute ex-
actness. More in-depth appraisals will be required and the trial court's assessment of
those appraisals will become of critical importance. For example, in most appraisals of
property similar to this marina, the value is often determined per measure. Buildings
are based on a square foot valuation while land is often valued on a per acre basis.
However, when the appraised value of the property given in payment approximates
the amount of the debt, the parties to a revocatory action will certainly place much
greater emphasis on determining the exact value of the property, down to the smallest
detail. An approximation based on a per measure valuation will no longer be sufficient.
62. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1980-84. For example, article 1981 provides that a
creditor may set aside a fraudulent transfer by his debtor when the value of the prop-
erty transferred exceeds by one-fifth the price of consideration given for it. Article
1982 extends this to situations when the property is transferred in consideration of a
sum that is due and both the transferor and the transferee are parties to the fraud.
The remedy is the placement of the parties in the situ quo ante. In the instant case,
the property given in payment exceeded the amount of the debt by slightly less than
one-fifth. See note 52, supra. These articles, however, are not the exclusive remedy for
the creditor. Rather, they serve as a guideline to aid the creditor in meeting his dif-
ficult burden of proving fraud.
63. There are provisions in the Code which define the threshold of fraud in cer-
tain instances. For example, article 1861, dealing with lesion beyond moiety, requires
that this excess be greater than one-half before the transferor is allowed to rescind.
Article 1981 requires this excess to be greater than one-fifth the value received when
the transfer is made in fraud of creditors. However, there is no general formula for
determining the amount of excess given over the value received that will cause the
transfer to be set aside because of prejudice.
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another judicial sale provoked, it is likely that even if the proceeds
exceeded the fair market value of the property, any such excess
would have been consumed by the costs involved in the judicial
sale."
Thus, the rationale of the majority in refusing to set aside the
dation is apparent: had the dation en paiement been rescinded, the
complaining creditor nevertheless would have received nothing once
the claims of superior creditors had been paid. 5 The dissent claims
that any excess value given over the amount of the debt resulted in
prejudice to all remaining unsecured creditors, allowing any of them
to bring the revocatory action. It is submitted that the court, should
not have reached these issues without first making a clear deter-
mination of the timing of the releases. If indeed the releases of the
inferior secured creditors were obtained prior to the execution of
the dation en paiement, these creditors were reduced to the status
of unsecured creditors and the action for rescission should have
been granted. On the other hand, if the court had inadequate infor-
mation before it in the record to ascertain the time sequence involved,
the case should have been remanded for a factual determination of
the timing of the dation and the releases; only then could a factual
determination of prejudice be made.
By failing to address the question of the timing of the releases/
given by inferior secured creditors, the supreme court has left
uncertain the ability of creditors to rescind a dation en paiement
made in fraud of their rights and to their prejudice. The Civil Code
contains only vague references to the concept of prejudice; the
resultant difficulty in defining the scope of prejudice is evident in
the majority and dissenting opinions of the instant case. Given the
present ambiguity, it would be highly desirable for the court to con-
front the issue of prejudice directly and illuminate each element of
this elusive concept. Otherwise, creditors may continue to be denied
the right to initiate a successful revocatory action.
Paul David
64. The complaining creditor raised a contrary argument, stating that depriving
creditors of the right to buy the property at a judicial sale, regardless of the likely out-
come, resulted in prejudice, citing Quality Finance Co. of Donaldsonville, Inc. v. Bour-
que, 315 So. 2d 656 (La. 1975). Transcript of Proceedings Before Twenty-Second
Judicial District Court, Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 2-3, Martin LeBreton Ins.
Agency v. Phillips, 364 So. 2d 1032, (La. 1978). The supreme court dimissed the argu-
ment, saying that the decision in Quality was limited to the narrow issue of whether a
transferee of property in a dation is entitled to have the inferior mortgages and liens
recorded against the property cancelled. 364 So. 2d at 1035.
65. It is noteworthy that the complaining creditor had not done everything it
could have done to secure its interest. Although Martin LeBreton could have protected
its claim by a timely recordation of its mortgage, it delayed doing so for a month and
the dation was executed in the interim. See note 40, supra.
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